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Foreword 
At one time economics and ecology said the same thing about population: beyond a 
certain moderate density an increment of population will be harmful. But in recent years 
neoclassical economics has diverged sharply from biology. Now if the administrator asks 
an economist of this persuasion whether promoting birth control is important he will get 
the answer "Not veryn; if he asks a biologist he will get "Very important". The adminis- 
trator is left to  resolve a question that is too difficult for the scholars in the field. 
This puts an unprecedented ambiguity into the policy analysis of population. What 
is needed is a theoretical framework in which both disciplines are incorporated, so that 
there will be one recommendation only, rather than two that cancel one another out. 
The two papers that follow are a first attempt a t  such a reconciliation. People are 
seen as living within an economy, and the economy is located within the ecosphere. Medi- 
ating between them is the culture, that both sets objectives for individuals and provides 
the technology by which they attain those objectives. On this theoretical approach the 
population is at the center of a succession of nested boxes representing the economy, the 
culture, and the environment. The papers work out some of the consequences of this a p  
proach. They recognize the flexibility of substitution under the price system, as well as 
the limits the environment sets on any possible economy. 
Nathan Keyfitz 
Leader, Population Program 
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MANAGING WORLD POPULATION 
THE BIOSPHERE 
If the planet Earth is represented by a globe two feet in diameter, the biosphere 
within which human and other life goes on is a shell on the exterior of that  globe. If the 
globe were truly a miniature of the planet most life would be contained within the paint 
that  designates countries and geographical features on its surface. However it is defined, 
the mass of the biosphere is less than one percent of the mass of a planet that  itself is 
small in relation to  the solar system and insignificant as a part of the galaxy. 
To  think effectively about that  small and fragile biosphere and the 5 billion people 
supported in it we must take account of 
its economies, 
its cultures and especially the technologies by which goods and services are pro- 
duced, 
the non-human environment. 
POPULATION, THE ECONOMY, CULTURE, ENVIRONMENT 
These are best seen as boxes within boxes. Humans look after their material needs 
by means of an economy, and the economy is embedded in an ecology. The interaction 
between the economy and the ecology is mediated by the culture. We people are thus the 
center of a sequence of nested boxes-moving outward from us as a population we find 
ourselves supported successively by the economy, the culture, and the environment or eco- 
sphere. The economy can only use such materials as are available in the ecosphere; its 
means of using them constitute the technology that  is part of the culture. 
Another part of the culture is the purposes for which people live, and which deter- 
mine the goods and services that  they put the economy to  procuring for them; the 
purposes-what they regard as "good", as the unquestioned purpose of life-range all the 
way from owning irrigated rice land in Java, to  owning a herd of cattle in the Sahel, to  
driving a Mercedes in Europe. The ultimate may be an activity rather than a 
possession-performing bravely as a member of an Iroguois war party, or praying and 
fasting to  prepare one's soul for the next world; these different ends require different sorts 
of equipment. What people set the economy t o  procuring, and with what technology, 
greatly affects the ecosphere, and with the large populations now extant the effect can be 
massive. 
Those three nested boxes are of course a scheme of analysis rather than concrete ob- 
jects. Their purpose is to  unify what the several disciplines have t o  say about population, 
t o  avoid the confusion that  results when disciplines draw their conclusions independently 
of the findings of other disciplines that deal with the same objects. Contemplating the 
economy in abstraction from the ecology easily leads to  the conclusion that  population 
can expand indefinitely; this a mistake that the classical economists carefully avoided. 
With the greater academic specialization of today, one discipline can say that  there are 
too many people and another that  there are too few, so population policy is left hanging. 
Theory and data that  embrace the three boxes simultaneously ought to  produce unambi- 
guous conclusions. 
For such combined analysis we need a long view; the several phenomena operate in 
different time scales. The economy shows significant changes month by month, while 
changes in the ecology proceed over decades and centuries. This factual discordance is 
amplified by a discordance in data. We have formidable means of keeping track of the 
economy, but virtually no time series on the ecology. We do not systematically follow the 
extinction of species, the spread of deserts, the pollution of the oceans as we follow the 
prices of stocks, the profits of corporations, the exchange values of currencies. We have a 
world census of population every ten years, but no corresponding world census of the 
non-human species on which the population depends. 
The partial da ta  can be misleading, as where the national income includes payment 
for the work done to restore the damaged environment, for example after an oil spill, but 
makes no subtraction for the damage itself. It thus reports us as getting richer and richer 
in the measure in which we do damage that  needs restoring. This is more important now 
than when we were few and our technical means were feeble. The ecosphere affects us 
greatly even though it is statistically invisible. And that  which is made visible by statis- 
tics is often given a biased name: our accounting systems call "production" much of what 
is ecological destruction-for example the removal of fossil fuels from underground d e p e  
sits and their burning in internal combustion engines on land or in the air. 
The life we know is as small in time as it is in space. As recently as 10,000 years ago 
agriculture was invented, people gathered into small neolithic settlements, and a form of 
writing supplemented oral communication. What we can call a human consciousness em- 
erged. At that  time, 115 of a second ago on the one-day scale of earth's history, there 
were 5 to  10 million of our ancestors, not enough to  exercise much influence on the ecole 
gy in which they lived and worked. It is only in these last 10,000 years that  the planet 
has come to  be fully occupied by man, and in decades (say the last millisecond) in which 
industrial civilization has existed, human agency has made changes comparable in magni- 
tude with those over millions of years of geological time. Forests that  grew over millen- 
nia, soils that  took millions of years to  create, are used up in a single lifetime. 
The population of the world a t  mid-century was 2 112 billion; some time in 1987 it 
passed 5 billion, who suffice to crowd into and transform every accessible part of the 
planet. The increase in the last 40 years was equal to the total increase over the millions 
of years from when pre-humans came down from the trees up to  1950. According to p r e  
jections made by the United Nations, another 35 years, to 2025, will see a further increase 
to  8 112 billion. As recently as Shakespeare's time England had fewer than 5 million p e e  
ple; it was 200 years after Shakespeare before the United States attained 5 million. Now 
they have respectively 50 and 245 millions. 
Looking at  the prospective increase of 3 112 billion from 1985 to 2025 we find that  
only 178 million of it is in the countries that  are classified as developed, while 3,434 mil- 
lion will be in the LDCs, again according to the UN estimates. That  is to  say that  only 5 
percent of the anticipated increase will be in the MDCs; 95 percent will be in the LDCs 
(Table 1). 
Should we be worrying about this absolute increase of 3.592 billions, or should we 
take satisfaction in the observation that  the increase is slowing? Between 1980 and 1985 
the total population increased by 9 percent; between 2020 and 2025 the projected popula- 
tion goes up only 4 percent. Yet the absolute curve is sharply upward. 
Table 1. Population of the world, less and more developed countries 1950-2025 
(000,000). 
Year w o r l d  LDC MDC 
Projection 
Source: Tape provided to the author by the United Nations, giving its 1988 assessment 
for 182 countries and regions of the world. 
The ambiguity for total population is even more striking for births, as Table 2's 
birth numbers and rates show. The absolute numbers of births will still be considerably 
greater in 2020 than they are now. It will be well into the second quarter of the 21st cen- 
tury before the absolute number of births will come down even to  the high levels of today, 
while the population curve will continue to  slope upwards well beyond that  time. 
Thus we have two views in confrontation with one another, both based on empirical 
data.  On the one hand, the crude birth rate has been declining ever since 1950; i t  is now 
lower than a decade ago and its decline will undoubtedly continue. Those rates reflect 
average behavior in a way that  totals do not. Yet on the other hand, absolute numbers 
are rising, and it is not rates that  crowd and pollute, but absolute numbers of people. 
One presentation of population time series can give the impression of impending ex- 
plosion; another suggests impending extinction. Even in the part of our subject most 
solidly documented by statistics there is ambiguity. 
A similar issue arises on attributes of people. It is probable that  the absolute 
number of people in the world who are hungry is increasing, while the fraction that  they 
are of the total population is declining. Is this progress or retrogression? 
The impact of people depends not only on their numbers but on their setting in the 
biosphere. Here again existing statistics have major gaps; we do not know how many are 
cattle herders on arid lands; how many are dependent on crops produced by fossil water 
and the rate a t  which that  water is being used up. We do have the territorial distribution 
of people, as in Table 3, tha t  shows the ten countries with over 100 million people in 
1988, again as estimated by the United Nations. But these political units are not a p  
propriate for ecological analysis; we should have the indigenous population living in tropi- 
cal forests, people living less than one meter above sea level, those in river basins subject 
to  periodic flooding. 
Table 2. Population, births and birth rates, World, 1950-2020. 
Year 
Annual Crude birth 
Population births rate 
(000,000s) (000s) (per 1000) 
Estimates based on data  
Projections 
Source: United Nations, 1988. 
Table 3. Population of the ten largest countries, 1988 and 2025 (000s). 
1988 2025 Av. % inc. 
1. China 
2. India 
3. USSR 
4. us 
5. Indonesia 
6. Brazil 
7. Japan 
8. Pakistan 
9. Bangladesh 
10. Nigeria 
We get some hint of ecological change from the sequence of changes during the 37 
years, with Pakistan, and Bangladesh passing Japan, and Nigeria catching up to the Unit- 
ed States. That  poorer countries overtake and pass richer countries in population will by 
itself adversely affect global income distribution. 
CHANGE PRACTICES OR CONTROL POPULATION? 
Cultures have modified themselves in response t o  their visible effects on the environ- 
ment. What we call traditional good farming or good forestry practice is maintaining the 
land in such condition that  it will keep producing indefinitely; in Europe and America, as 
well as much of Asia, the traditional perspective was long range. But tradition is not 
everywhere a protection: the loggers of Nepal, like the cattle-raisers of the Sahel, have im- 
provident traditions. They do not seem about to  change their practices; indeed they are 
too poor t o  risk any change a t  all, and the more of them there are the more quickly they 
destroy their resource base. 
One can say of them as of many other groups: if they were fewer they would destroy 
less; if they had better practices they would destroy less. If the automobile-users were 
fewer they would consume less fuel and generate less smog; if they moved around with 
public transport they would similarly use less fuel and generate less smog. Everywhere 
we turn we meet this symmetry between numbers of people on the one side and harmful 
practices on the other. 
This makes possible endless debate on the policy to  be followed. The populationists 
can say that  the number of people does little harm in itself, but only exacerbates the 
effect of bad practices. Ecologists can say that  the bad practices should of course be 
rectified, but meanwhile the population had better control its numbers. 
WHEN MORE PEOPLE WERE NEEDED 
It is the RECENCY of the population growth and the assault on the environment 
that  makes i t  hard to  appreciate the damage being done. After all, through long ages 
more people were desired. They added to  the strength of the family that  bore them and 
of the kingdom in which they labored. In 17th century Europe the weaving of cloth was 
labor intensive, and populations were much smaller than the land could sustain, so a ruler 
could in effect turn people into cloth, and cloth could be sold abroad and so turned into 
gold. Masses of laborers could still be used in the early phases of the industrial revolu- 
tion. 
Since then population has everywhere increased greatly and a t  the same time tech- 
niques of production have changed. Beyond those changes an equalitarian ethos has 
spread. As Alfred Sauvy tells us in an illuminating metaphor, the farmer optimizes by 
having the maximum number of cows his land can adequately feed. But the optimum for 
the cows is not the same as the optimum for the farmer. A farmer aiming to  maximize 
the per capita amenities of his cows (read people) would have far fewer of them. Once the 
cows are in a position t o  demand equality with the farmer the hour of Malthus has ar- 
rived. 
The three conditions applying up t o  the 19th century-small population in relation 
to  fertile land, technology that  requires masses of laborers, and concern for the welfare of 
rulers rather than of peoples-apply much less today. Food supplies in many LDC areas 
are precarious and labor-saving technology makes it more difficult to  turn unequipped 
workers into gold. Quite the contrary-LDCs spend gold (i.e. US dollars that  they do not 
have) to  buy equipment in order that  they might employ their populations. And the 
equipment (designed to  be used in countries where labor is scarce) requires relatively few 
people to  run it,  so even a t  the height of the borrowing the unemployed kept increasing. 
Are the unemployed evidence of overpopulation? Or are they not rather evidence of 
a badly run economy, in which wages of those who do have jobs are kept artificially high? 
Anything, including labor, will remain unused if its price is maintained above what 
buyers can afford to  pay for it. Where national leaders see the absolute political impossi- 
bility of freeing their labor markets, they a t  least want to  add as few further people as 
possible, knowing that  one birth prevented now is one less unemployed in 2010. And 
since the same political forces are spreading education rapidly, that  unemployed person is 
likely to  be a high school or college graduate, and therefore especially dangerous to  politi- 
cal stability. 
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN POOR COUNTRIES 
Thus various elements of the technology and the political culture threaten stability 
as population increases in the LDCs. Beyond them environmental issues are emerging in 
the LDCs-one  is floods due to deforestation, whose effects are accentuated by the rise in 
ocean levels. Thailand has recently banned all logging, and Malaysia is considering the 
same, even though for these countries timber and its ~ r o d u c t s  are an  important source of 
foreign exchange. Bangladesh suffers from timber cutting in Nepal and can do nothing to 
check it. 
The rise in levels when the oceans warm up is an especially grim prospect for the 
countries that  have large populations in flat river deltas like those of the Ganges and the 
Mekong. Much of the population of Java lives close to sea level. On some Pacific islands 
the entire territory is a t  risk. One can see environmental refugees moving inland from the 
coasts throughout Asia, and Australia is already discussing what to do if refugees come to  
it from submerging islands. 
Emil Salim, Indonesia's Minister of Population and Environment, has spoken of the 
need for defenses against the sea. These are expensive-they may fit into the budget of 
the Netherlands, but hardly into that  of Bangladesh. The carbon dioxide that  is the 
cause of the trouble is mostly produced by the industrial countries; its harmful effects will 
be felt by some of the poorest of the LDCs. (And this a t  the same time as the banks of 
the industrial countries are trying to collect debts, while the governments of the industrial 
countries raise obstacles to  the import of their goods-the only means by which the debts 
can be repaid.) All of these elements drastically affect the capacity of the LDCs to  s u p  
port present and prospective populations. 
TIME FRAMES FOR THE ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
What do extinction of species, forest dieback, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and 
the exploitation of the Amazon have in common? That none of them will affect us much 
in the next few years, but all of them will have serious consequences during the 21st cen- 
tury. These long-term, slow acting phenomena could nullify much of the real economic 
progress that  we enjoy, and we need to  see as things are now set up what institutions and 
what individuals are monitoring and controlling them. 
The future is very much thought about by economists, who summarize the way it 
acts on the present through the rate of interest or discount. If the interest rate is 9 per- 
cent then a good that  we will receive a year from now is worth only 1/1.09 as much as the 
same good receivable today. When the economic actors make calculations in this way the 
free market is supposed fairly t o  evaluate future goods and bads. 
But is the rate of interest established by transactions between lenders and borrowers 
the right one for evaluating future events in the biosphere? At the current interest rate 
paid on treasury bills, a loss of the entire wheat crop through drought in the year 2100 is 
to  be multiplied by 1/(1.09) to  the 110th power (equal t o  0.000076) to  establish the 
equivalent loss today. The world crop of all cereals in the year 2100, say 3 billion tons, is 
thus only worth about 200,000 tons now. Businessmen responsible to  shareholders cannot 
afford to  take any other attitude to  the future than to  discount according t o  the rate a t  
which they borrow and lend money. Yet the year 2100 would in due course come around, 
and there would be no wheat, rice, or corn, no meat derived from these-in short univer- 
sal starvation. 
If the custody of the planet cannot be safely trusted to  the market, then it must be 
placed in the hands of government. But experience shows that governments have an even 
shorter perspective than business. In the spirit of democracy they discount heavily any 
events occurring after the next election. 
Many who distrust both business and government as custodians of the future console 
themselves with the thought that  things are changing fast, and some way of circumvent- 
ing environmental danger and resource exhaustion will be discovered in time. Bioen- 
gineering will make a second Green Revolution (perhaps based on plants that  thrive on 
salt water) that  will remedy the hunger left over from the first. When we run out of oil 
we will have safe fusion t o  fall back on, so electricity will be cheaper than ever. Long be- 
fore the commercially exploitable sources of copper are used up, electricity will be tran- 
sported by ceramic superconductors. In a free economy where everyone pays for all 
benefits received (i.e. there are no externalities) shortage of any kind generates the techni- 
cal change that  circumvents the shortage. 
With powerful technology prompted by the market it is government that  seems t o  
prevent the economy from substituting and adapting and so creates all our troubles. Yet 
this common negative way of describing government does an injustice t o  its role in estab- 
lishing a free market. The market is far from natural, but requires a rare kind of govern- 
ment: one assigned unlimited power to  maintain law and order and private property (in- 
cluding elimination of externalities), that  then refrains from abusing this power t o  its own 
advantage. And the more it abuses, the more protest is engendered, the more maintain- 
ing itself in powers takes precedence over all other concerns, and the less it will yield to  
the power of the market. 
Where such self-denial cannot be counted on the substitution and flexibility of which 
the economy is capable will be only partially available, technical skills only partially en- 
gaged. There will be the shortages and dangers that we know, along with their effect on 
the capacity to  support population. In particular national authorities find it nearly im- 
possible t o  act together to  internalize damage to the planet. 
EQUILIBRIA 
Other articles of this issue of Scientific American deal with the equilibria of natural 
processes. Here it need only be said that the forces under the control of man, large 
though they seem, are wholly inadequate t o  rectify major disequilibria in nature. It is as 
though we had the Washington monument standing on its point; if there were no wind 
and a refined monitoring of its verticality it could be maintained in that  position with al- 
most no force-the muscles of one man could keep it in balance. But once it started to  
tilt and fall no existing equipment could hold it. The analogy applies to  the temperature 
balance of the planet, as to  the balance of species in a tropical forest threatened with 
pioneer-type cutting. Not only is our industrial society brief in time, and occupying the 
paper-thin surface of the planet, but the forces it commands a t  any one moment are small 
in relation to the cumulative changes that  it is causing in various global equilibria. 
WHERE TECHNICAL ADVANCE LEAVES OFF 
Technical advance is not likely to oppose those geophysical forces that  we have set 
in motion. No technology is going to  counter the warming of the atmosphere or fill the 
hole in the ozone layer. If the market cannot cope with them, and governments give 
them low priority, then to  whom can we turn? Scientists do not command the facilities, 
political or financial, to  lower automobile speed limits or to  force the abandonment of 
dangerous aerosols. West Germany has the largest scientific establishment and the larg- 
est green party in Europe; it is also the country with no speed limits on its highways. Its 
auto-makers have more influence than its scientists. So forest dieback accelerates. 
For individual countries, let alone for the planet as a whole, the mandate to  protect 
the ecosphere is unassigned. The least one can say is that  every aspect of the problem is 
eased by having fewer rather than more people. 
All this disturbs the comfortable vision of a world wide high consumption society, in 
which well paying jobs are available for those who can work, and those who can not are 
covered by social security paid for out of high and increasing production. The consumer 
society where social ascent is proven by two automobiles and two homes for every family 
remains the ideal. With no more than one quarter of the planetary population sharing 
that  middle class life style, and i t  not fully, we already have problems: acid rain is des- 
troying forests in Germany, Canada, and elsewhere; the fisheries catch has ceased to in- 
crease, coal is polluting and the hoped-for transition to  nuclear has been postponed by 
high cost and political resistance, land everywhere is overcropped. Americans may have 
somewhat lowered their consumption of meat, but others are eating more, and so passing 
ever more corn through animals on its way to  people. The well-off in the rich countries 
may have started to  see through the social mobility game that  is so expensive in space 
and resources, but those who have not yet climbed the ladder are pressing to  get a foot on 
it. 
MODERN RESTLESSNESS 
Much of the damage to  the ecosphere is related to  movement and travel. A middle 
class American eats somewhat more than an Asian peasant, has somewhat more clothes, 
has more varied entertainment, but none of these require extravagant amounts of 
resources. In an ecological perspective it is the mode and amount of movement that  prin- 
cipally distinguishes the American town dweller from the Asian peasant. 
A person can walk a mile on 100 kcalories, say burning one slice of bread; 5 billion 
people walking 10 miles per day take a few million tons of grain more than they would 
need if wholly sedentary. For an automobile to go one mile requires 1/10 of a liter of 
gasoline, say 1000 kcalories. There are now 500,000,000 registered automotive vehicles on 
the planet (473.4 million in 1984-Stat. Abstr. 1987, p. 826), and on the average they use 
nearly 2 gallons of fuel per day, or about 1/20 of a barrel of oil. Filling the tanks of the 
world automobile fleets takes about one third of the 60 million or so barrels of oil raised 
above ground each day. 
Most of this feverish movement is of the 1.2 billion people in the MDCs; the 3.8 bil- 
lion in the LDCs move much less. We can think of the former as circulating within a ra- 
dius of 50 miles, the latter of 5 miles. But things are changing. Up to recently the major 
part of annual automotive production for replacements and new cars has served the MDC 
populations. With the present rate of economic progress we can expect that  the annual 
net global increase in registrations of 4.5 percent will continue, but with less and less of it 
in the MDCs, now nearing saturation of their markets; most further expansion will be in 
the LDCs. 
Notice that  the trend in automobiles and planes is upward, and a t  a sharper angle 
than that  of population. If i t  goes up by the past rate of 4.5 percent per year and popula- 
tion by less than 2 percent, then year by year the output of the byproducts of combustion 
engines increases more by economic growth than it does by increased population. By 
2025 the population will have nearly doubled from the 4 112 billion of 1980, the automo- 
biles will be fourfold, having doubled twice. With fixed efficiency each person will be con- 
tributing about double the carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and other chemicals as in 1980. 
The technology is available to  serve the purposes of much of this travel by ecologi- 
cally softer means. Video telephones could allow friends and relatives t o  keep in touch; 
video conferences could replace much of business travel; T V  and video tapes can show the 
scenery on other parts of the country or the globe that people now travel to. Yet viewing 
foreign landscapes on T V  has stimulated rather than diminished travel. 
The wish to get into one's car and drive a hundred miles, or go by plane a thousand 
miles, in order to swim and sunbathe is strong. A purely cultural feature underlies the 
economics; one can demonstrate this by noting that  an Austrian town may have its own 
swimming pool, indoor or outdoor, perhaps with a sandy area beside i t ,  and hundreds of 
people walk to  it on weekends and do just what their American opposite numbers do by 
driving 100 or more miles. Will the culture shift in a direction that  will spare the bio- 
sphere? That is as hard to  answer for American sunbathers as for African cattle-herders. 
CONCLUSION 
What comes out of all this on the relation between population, the economy, the cul- 
ture, and the biosphere? 
1) For the developed countries early fears for exhaustion of resources occasioned by po- 
pulation pressure were largely groundless; economies are free enough and technology 
sufficiently advanced that  the price system will overcome shortages. So here in the 
MDCs, just where population is stationary in any case, it has the least reason to 
control its numbers. 
2) For the LDCs where now 95 percent of the increase is occurring, exhaustion of lands 
and food shortages are a genuine hazard. The ability to  support population has been 
diminished by governments that  borrowed irresponsibly (for instance in Latin Amer- 
ica), that  are hopelessly corrupt (for instance in Africa) or that  fail to maintain ord- 
er (again in Africa). Order is threatened also by educational systems that  are good 
enough to arouse expectations, but not good enough to teach productive skills, that  
generate unemployment as much as they generate production. Under these cir- 
cumstances population control is an urgent necessity. In just the countries where it 
is most badly needed it is slowest in coming. 
3) The process of development in itself increases pressure on the ecosphere. It does so 
via the adoption of a culture that  increases meat consumption, and so puts pressure 
on land; that  demands factory goods, for which it burns coal and so pollutes the at- 
mosphere; and that  travels by automobile and airplane to an unprecedented degree. 
4) The developed countries are approaching a high but level consumption of commodi- 
ties and services with stress on qualitative change, and future quantitative expansion 
of industry and travel will be through the diffusion of industrial civilization through 
the LDCs. If there is no world depression this diffusion can be expected to  take 
place a t  the past rate of 4 to  5 per cent. That  is not going to  be fast enough to  em- 
ploy all of the educated manpower graduating from schools and universities. 
5) On the other hand it is likely to  be too fast for the ecosphere to absorb. We see this 
in the wasting of the thin topsoil of the Amazon, of the floods caused by excessive 
logging in Thailand, and especially of the changing composition of the atmosphere 
worldwide. 
6) Those who believe that  the debts are about to be paid off so that  investment can 
resume everywhere on a scale sufficient to absorb the educated unemployed, that  
corruption is about to cease, tha t  civil and international wars are finally ending, that  
forests will soon be replanted and that  technology is going to find an answer to  the 
C 0 2  and ozone problems, these will want to  allow population to  grow as it will. 
Those who doubt that  these good things are around the corner want to see all possi- 
ble effort made to  reach them AND every effort made also to disseminate the 
knowledge and means of population control. 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF POPULATION 
DEVELOPMENT INTERACTION 
This paper will juxtapose the divergent viewpoints of scholars on population and 
development, in the hope of contributing to a synthesis of what the several disciplines 
have to say about the effects of population increase. 
Economics has had the most to say. For its first hundred and seventy years of ex- 
istence as a science, say from soon after Adam Smith to Myrdal, Coale, Lewis and others 
writing up to the 1960s) it showed how large and growing populations handicap develop 
ment. During this time there was no major disagreement from others who looked into po- 
pulation. Sociologists took over the field after World War 11, resting especially on the in- 
creasing mass of statistical data, and they also found rapid population increase a major 
handicap to development. Biologists had always been interested in the subject, seeing 
man as an element in the ecology of the planet, and being familiar with instances of 
species, for instance locusts, that escape their natural checks and increase to  the point of 
destroying their habitat. The several disciplines quoted one another approvingly, begin- 
ning with Darwin's report that Malthus had given him the idea with which he could start 
his work. 
This unanimity has been disturbed in the past decade, as some economists claim 
that after all development is not much hindered by rapid growth (Simon, 1981; NRC, 
1986). I will argue that the switch derives mostly from general reading about the resource 
substitutions that science makes possible rather than from specifically economic data. On 
this view the case for birth control rests mostly on the right of individuals to decide how 
many children they are to have, a moral rather than an economic argument, and as such 
necessarily without any relation to evidence. The administrator who asks a neoclassical 
economist whether he should give high priority to birth control programs is told no; he 
then asks a biologist and is told yes. He is left to resolve a clash between disciplines that 
is too difficult for the experts in those disciplines to  resolve. 
A population, whether of humans or other species, exists in some kind of setting. 
Even a population of automobiles cannot be considered separately from the road network, 
repair facilities, gasoline stations and other elements of the environment in which those 
automobiles have their usefulness and continue to operate; LDCs in which much more in- 
vestment goes into the vehicles than in other elements of the system demonstrate this 
strikingly. The setting for man is a habitat or environment to biologists, the complemen- 
tary factors of production to economists. We will find that it is their different views of 
the setting that give rise to the different opinions on population control. 
I classify the reasons for population control under four heads, and find them subject 
to very different considerations. In four words they are resources, capital, employment, 
and Earth, and they constitute the four main sections of this essay. 
LAND A N D  OTHER RESOURCES 
For Malthus, writing at  the dawn of the industrial revolution, and not entirely ac- 
cepting the changes it was making, let alone foreseeing its imminent expansion, the set- 
ting was principally land. There was only so much of it and once this was full the further 
increase of population would have to share it, and hence would have to share the fixed 
amount of product. Of course this is too simple; the land is never full; it varies in quality 
from the most fertile to the downright uncultivable, and the more fertile is naturally set- 
tled and exploited first. As the population increases it has to move to less productive 
land, so with everything else fixed it becomes poorer and poorer. Even with the settlement 
of America, that was prominent in the minds of English theorists at the turn of the 19th 
century, the limits still applied, though they were farther in the future than in England. 
Malthus produced a simple and clearcut theory in 1798, further elaborated over the 
course of a few decades by himself, Ricardo, Mill and others, on which most secular 
thinkers-all those who were not bound to  an earlier religious or mercantilist view--could 
agree for the next 150 years. 
Energy 
As the industrial revolution advanced and the agricultural economy of England gave 
way to  factories, the same concept of limits and scarcity came to  be applied to  other na- 
tural resources than land, and especially to  coal. The most accessible seams were being 
exploited first, so coal would become more expensive, and England's manufacturing 
preeminence would sooner or later come to  an end. Stanley Jevons saw this as imposing a 
grave threat t o  the descendants of those then living, and advised that  a t  least the national 
debt be paid off. What now seems ridiculous (who pays off debts?) made a good deal of 
sense in the simple world of those times: after borrowing t o  build a factory one must take 
out of each year's sales the depreciation, i.e., one must set aside a due part for the repay- 
ment of the loan on which the factory was built. It was as though the coal was borrowed 
and posterity had t o  be compensated for its use, or a t  least not left in debt to  continue 
paying for it after it was exhausted. Jevons was an early believer in sustainable develop 
ment. 
But ultimately new sources of energy were developed that  had various advantages, 
and coal mines were abandoned long before their content was exhausted. The succession 
of fuels-oil, gas, nuclear-along with greater efficiency in their use, along with a shift to  
less energy-intensive industries, produced a strong impression that  the classics had 
focussed on the wrong problem. It was now the inventive process itself that  was the 
resource-the vision that  each kind of fuel would give place t o  some better fuel, even be- 
fore it was exhausted. Invention is no longer an accident attributable t o  genius; it is an 
established and continuing institution. In all fields of science, but especially in chemistry 
and biology, the computer so facilitates and automates research that  it seems as though 
progress will henceforth be automatic; now discoveries can be made t o  order. 
Social scientists read the newspapers and choose their theories accordingly. 
That perspective was applied to  every part of the setting in which people lived and 
gained their living. We did not need more land, just improved yields on the existing land. 
Copper, nickel, and other mines would be exhausted, but new sites would be discovered, 
and a t  the same time less scarce substitutes would be found. Glass fibers or microwaves 
would be used in place of copper, being more effective for transmission of signals, as well 
as less expensive. There was no use going to  expense t o  conserve the forests, for wood 
was being replaced with plastic for many uses, and paper was better made with cultivated 
fast-growing trees. 
Every week the press carries the news of some impending invention that  will 
dispense with some old material, or a t  least use it more economically. The substitution is 
always in one direction-towards the lower cost, more generally available, material: acryl- 
ic for wool, corn oil in the form of margarine for butter. And often the substitute is 
better as well as cheaper. Thus more people require more goods, and so more raw materi- 
als of every kind, and while this might disturb engineers who live in a world of fixed pro- 
portions, economists bet on flexibility; they show how substitution under the impulse of 
the price system can adapt t o  any shortcoming of nature. 
Even without substitution a small rise in price will cause more of most raw materials 
to  appear on the market. Higher prices cause people to look more diligently, and they 
find unsuspected sources-oil in the Arctic Ocean and the North Sea, nickel in a dozen 
countries where once it was exploited in Canada only. And with higher prices existing 
materials are used more sparingly: thinner coatings on tin cans, less gasoline per mile of 
travel, less land per ton of wheat. Now that safety and comfort are taken for granted the 
locus of competition among the world's aircraft manufacturers centers on fuel economy. 
The Euphoria of Technical Progress 
News items on technical wonders are the stuff that  fills the press. Today's (De- 
cember 15, 1988) International Herald Tribune reports that  a new transatlantic cable has 
just gone into service, using optical glass fibers, that  will be able to carry 40,000 simul- 
taneous conversations in clear and reliable transmission, and that  other such cables are 
under construction, both across the Atlantic and the Pacific. And as for paper, the need 
for which has been destroying the world's forests, the same issue of the Herald Tribune 
carries the word that  kenaf is coming into commercial production; it produces a whiter, 
tougher, more durable paper, tha t  is easier on the eyes than newsprint made from trees. 
Kenaf makes much more efficient use of earth and sunlight than do the wild tree species 
for which i t  substitutes. 
The sequence is dizzying. Invention has no limits. The public is elated with the ac- 
celerating progress, academics make theories that  take it into account, though they claim 
empirical support on another level. 
We are back to  the euphoric view of the 18th century enlightenment. Adam Smith 
was of the 18th century and an optimist-population was self-regulating. But after him 
economics became known as the dismal science because i t  said that  each increase in p r e  
duction would be nullified by a corresponding increase in population, so the average wel- 
fare could not in the long run increase. Malthus, Ricardo, the Mills saw population as 
setting the limit t o  progress, though they differed in their estimates of the capacity of 
people to  restrain their fertility. With a different rationale neeclassical economics is now 
back to  Adam Smith, even to  the mercantilists; Jean Bodin's "there is no wealth but 
men" is what Julian Simon (1981) is telling us. 
The neoclassicists are captivated by the stream of inventions. The one asset that  
counts is the ability to  innovate-to create new marvels and bring them into economic 
production. This merging of science into science fiction is the religion of our age, and it 
would be remarkable if i t  did not influence economics and social science generally. And in 
a competitive economy the enterprising innovators to  exploit new science will always be 
forthcoming. 
This intoxication with the process of invention became widespread by the 1950s and 
1960s. The word "Malthusian" came t o  mean a narrow, short-sighted niggardliness, a 
meaning it had always had in France, whose lands were more ample than those of Britain. 
A Malthusian, as Alfred Sauvy uses the term, is an over-cautious person fearful of a p  
parent limits to  resources, lacking confidence in future inventiveness and adaptation. He 
shows personal timidity in his fear of marrying and having a family. 
It is in the realm of food supplies, the original Malthusian limit, tha t  limits are now 
least believable for Europeans and Americans. Bitter contentions arise among nations on 
how to  dispose of surpluses of grain, chickens, wine and other foodstuffs without causing a 
price collapse. With their attention mainly on the developed countries, certainly disre- 
garding Africa, economists can indeed say that  the shortage of food has been definitively 
overcome. Similarly with other materials. Think of the 18th century when Britain was 
running short of firewood; the crisis was overcome with coal. Nuclear energy will supply 
stationary power; for motor cars fusion and the hydrogen economy are waiting in the 
wings, with assurances that  they will be ready for use long before oil and gas are exhaust- 
ed. 
The sequence of substitutions, starting with fertilizer for land in food production 
and of synthetics for land in the production of natural fibers seems endless. The evidence 
of abundance is seen in the market prices of minerals as well as of farm products. The 
colonial period came to  an end just as many of the goods which Europeans sought in the 
tropics-rubber, sisal, jute, kapok-were replaced by synthetics. My own sense is that 
Britain, the most farseeing of the colonial powers, made only token attempts to hold her 
colonies after World War 11, observing that their products were declining in value. Let 
the former colonial subjects be independent so that they can have the headache of manag- 
ing economies based on rubber, tin and jute. Why hold on to an economy based on tea 
when Coca Cola is cheaper to produce and more in demand? Sugar is in glut world wide, 
and tropical cane has no advantage over beets. The Netherlands did not foresee this im- 
mediately, but after forced decolonization they have replaced many of the products of the 
Indies-rubber, hemp, quinine-with more satisfactory products turned out by modern 
factories. 
Capital and skilled labor seem indefinitely substitutable for land. Hence it looks 
right to drop the classical "land" as a factor out of the production equation. I will argue 
that this applies a t  most to the developed countries, that are concerned about population 
decline. 
The neoclassical economists have found a solution to the problem of overpopulation 
appropriate to those countries where the problem is already solved. 
Each LDC has Its Own Population-Resources Problem, that may be 
Intractable Even if the World Population-Resources Problem is Easy 
The World Bank sums up the matter in its World Development Report of 1984: 
"The difficulties caused by rapid population growth are not primarily due to finite natural 
resources, a t  least not for the world as a whole." The last clause is important; it may be 
that in a well-managed world the sequence of inventions and their application would pro- 
vide for any population that is likely to  come into existence. 
No overall management is in sight. Moreover each of the LDCs has its own prob- 
lems. Each one needs to be studied to judge how much benefit it would obtain from popu- 
lation restraint. For most the current stream of inventions has brought grave drawbacks; 
they have felt the bad side of the substitution process, the devaluation of their tradition- 
al exports. With a few conspicuous exceptions they do not have the capacity to switch 
over to modern technology on the scale required. (par) President Sukarno once proposed 
a ten-year worldwide halt in all science and invention. That is symptomatic, and we 
should try to understand why many LDC officials do not share our elation with technolo- 
gy. 
Certainly the individual LDC is not capable of the research that will accommodate 
its growing population. The science of the advanced countries is available to i t ,  but the 
application of science requires organization and capital. In a time when capital is flowing 
from the LDCs to the MDCs (for the years 1983 to  1987 in the net amount of $93 billions, 
estimates the World Development Report for 1988, p. 30) investment funds in the LDCs 
are very tight. 
Section 2 will discuss the limits capital sets on the capacity of countries to  grow 
economically at the same time as they grow demographically, and Section 3 will take up 
the matter of organization, specifically in relation to  employment. 
A 180 Degree Turn in a Fundamental Principle of Economics 
An outsider can well be surprised that a proposition so basic to all economics up to 
about 1960 has since then not only been qualified but it has been reversed, virtually re- 
placed by its opposite. Those of us who have been looking for some cumulation in social 
science, especially in economics that has been the most hopeful, cannot but be discouraged 
by the sudden turn. Were Ricardo, Malthus, and their successors down to  Gunnar Myr- 
dal dull-witted, incapable of observing the world? 
It is the world that  has changed. Communication (e.g. television), the conquest of 
space, computing, the new cellular biology, atomic physics, were indeed changing the 
world a t  exactly the time when economists discovered human capital. 
Nonlinearity 
Even if this was applicable to  the LDCs (I will argue that  is not) i t  could be true for 
the recent past, and yet there may be a hiatus with the increase of scale. The population 
of Africa is expected t o  grow about 3 times from now to  2025. We do not live in a linear 
world, and extrapolation to  the future that tell us that  Africa's problems will be multi- 
plied by 3 could be deceptive; they could be multiplied by 27, the fourth power of the po- 
pulation. 
For an example of nonlinearity as well as nonsubstitutability, consider water. Arid 
regions depend on fossil water, and in some parts of the world it is necessary t o  go down 
100 meters or more to  reach the deposits. There comes a point a t  which the underground 
reservoir is used up, and a t  that  point linear extrapolation fails. One need not be an ad- 
dict of science fiction to  accept that  the stream of invention will continue. But some- 
where there are limits to  what invention can do: just as it cannot make space, it cannot 
produce fresh water on an economic scale. Finding food plants that  can thrive on sea wa- 
ter is more hopeful than finding enough energy to duplicate the sun's work of distilling the 
oceans, but we do not know how feasible that will be. So far turning deserts into tillable 
land has been possible on a very small scale only. But for the moment let us overlook the 
uncertainty that  nonlinearities introduce and the unfinished business of science. 
CAPITAL STILL SETS A LIMIT TO GROWTH 
The turn from the dark pessimism of the classics to bland neoclassical optimism was 
not yet complete by the 1960s. Following the work of Coale and Hoover (1958), it be- 
came customary to  say that  resources set no limit on absolute population numbers, but 
shortage of capital does. Capital was no longer the loom constructed by the village car- 
penter, on which the village wives and daughters could weave cloth for local consumption; 
that  kind of home-made capital could not survive in the face of automated looms abroad. 
LDCs could no longer convert without limit their simple largely rural labor into capital; 
capital was something purchased from the city, in great part brought from overseas. And 
the amount that  could be bought depended on savings, and savings could be greater for a 
couple with two children than for a couple with 5 or more. The cost of feeding, clothing, 
schooling, children reduced the family's and the community's savings. More important 
than this the grown child had t o  be equipped with capital if he was t o  earn a living; the 
more new workers that  had to  be so equipped the less funds for buying the new kinds of 
equipment that  would transform and modernize the economy. So it was still important 
for the LDCs to  restrain their reproduction, even if science could produce unlimited 
resources. 
That held for a decade or two, but then neoclassical economics took a further turn 
that  nullified even this reason for controlling population. Savings of households were not 
important; what counted were undistributed profits of enterprises, and these did not 
depend on how many children people had. Moreover invention would not only dispense 
with any limits set by land and natural resources, it would also make capital cheaper. 
More reliable and more durable equipment, insofar as it lasted longer, could not only save 
labor but could also be cheaper per year of service. Besides that ,  many of the gains in 
productivity in the advanced countries were found to  depend little on capital, and much 
on the operation on the shop floor. Whole warehouses of spare parts could be eliminated 
by the Japanese "just on time" delivery from the parts plant to  the assembly plant. 
Such considerations influenced not only public thinking about economics, but also 
the technical models. Where production functions used to contain land, labor and capital, 
they now specified labor alone. The skill of the labor was of course important, and the 
educated labor came to  be called "human capital". The implication of this expression is 
that people can substitute for physical capital. (Yet as Herman Daly points out, a 
house-builder lacking saws cannot make up for this by hiring more carpenters.) 
That seemed to remove the last of the limits to  growth. If people-human 
capital-are the sole agent of production, then there can be no such thing as too many 
people. With each added person there is the same addition to  product as for the previous 
person. So much for John Stuart Mill's declining productivity as population grows 
beyond a certain optimum point. 
Yet capital does not come so easy to the LDCs. Most have already stretched their 
credit beyond all caution. What is the LDC debt crisis all about if not that capital is tru- 
ly scarce? American and German banks counted on the development process to make the 
LDCs rich enough that they could repay their loans with ease. (They also counted on 
net imports of manufactured goods from the LDCs to service the debt-that would ruin 
many manufacturing industries.) What they did not count on was that the rhythm of 
development is of a lower order of speed than the rhythm of debt accumulation). It was 
the political pressure to make employment for a growing labor force that as much as any- 
thing impelled the overborrowing. That will be the third of my four topics. 
I leave the resources question with some question marks, and the capital issue with 
grave doubts, and go on to two other points that constitute obstacles to  population and 
welfare even if the succession of mechanical marvels is unlimited. One is the capacity to 
share the work and the product under rapid population increase, the other is the capacity 
of the planet to absorb the effluents of progress. 
ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION OF A GROWING POPULATION 
According to the classics there can be no unemployment. Just as the market will 
reach equilibrium prices that will clear all goods, so it will clear all labor. This law was 
put in its most unqualified form by Jean-Baptiste Say (1803)) and reiterated by virtually 
every economist up to  the 1930s. Thus Alfred Marshall (1930), "The whole of a man's 
(sic) income is expended in the purchase of services and commodities .... a man purchases 
labor and commodities with that portion of his income which he saves just as much as he 
does with that which he is said to spend." Each man (or woman) is giving employment 
with his whole earnings, and the recipient of these likewise; the circulation of goods and 
money leaves no room for unemployment. In Frank W. Taussig's (1917) words, "The 
money which is put by ... leads equally to the employment of labor (with the money that is 
directly spent on goods)." Commodity markets look after the disposal of goods, capital 
markets reconcile savings and investment, labor markets get people into jobs. 
Just the same there was long an underground in economics that doubted the capaci- 
ty of markets to do all these things. J.A. Hobson declared that oversaving results in un- 
derconsumption, a thought that is also to  be found in Malthus and in Marx. This under- 
ground emerged to  orthodoxy in the work of Keynes (1936) and suddenly underconsump 
tion was no longer an i d e e  fize of cranks. Because liquidity is desired the market-clearing 
rate of interest is set higher than the marginal productivity of capital, so will people will 
try to  save more than entrepreneurs want to invest. 
Yet in discovering the cause Keynes could point to the remedy: suitable monetary 
and especially fiscal policies would create demand, raise the marginal productivity of capi- 
tal, and get the unemployed back to  work. For the first time respectable economics as- 
signed governments an active role, far beyond the maintenance of order. By the pros- 
perous 1960s this idea had so taken that economists spoke of "fine-tuning" the economy. 
With this condition the optimism of Say and Marshall could be restored. Under no cir- 
cumstances was unemployment ever a sign that  there were too many people, but only of 
bad policies. 
Yet in fact there seem to  be persisting mechanisms by which some people are kept 
out of the economy. In Italy unemployment of the younger age groups reaches 30 per 
cent, and does not decline even amid the general prosperity. It is true that  in Italy there 
is unexampled rigidity in the labor market. It  is so expensive for an employer to dismiss 
a worker that  he will go to  great lengths to avoid hiring new employees. Italians talk 
about the difficulty that  youth has to insert itself ("inrrerirrre" is the usual word) into the 
labor force, somehow to  come to  participate in the economy. 
Once in the person is employed for life and a t  an above-equilibrium wage, so i t  is almost 
as though there are two kinds of people-the permanently employed and the permanently 
unemployed. To  an outsider the unemployment of the young is a simple consequence of 
the old hanging on to  their jobs and their high wages, irrespective of competence and dili- 
gence, in which they are protected both by the law and by unions. Governments listen 
to  those that  are safely in employment, not to  those who are trying to  get in. Does that  
prove that  there are too many people? I will try to  answer this question. 
The Wall that Produces the Jobholders 
Suppose a city with plenty of land, capital and jobs, and full employment, surround- 
ed by a high wall. Outside the wall are many young people, with no chance of access to  
the economy within the city because it is the preserve of those already in place. A policy 
analyst must say in this situation either that  the wall should be broken down, or the 
young people should go away. Either one of these is the solution to  the employment 
problem. Not economics but the distribution of power will decide which happens. 
The wall that  I speak of is the set of laws, regulations, and practices that  include 
minimum wages, tenure, requirements of admission to professions that  have nothing to  do 
with performance. In milder form they exist in the United States, but because they are 
milder the amount of unemployment they cause is less. They exist in LDCs as well as in 
MDCs, in rich countries like Sweden as in poor ones like Indonesia. Even where the ad- 
vantages of a free market are most clearly understood, no one wants his own labor to  be 
disposed by the market, and people agree to  secure the benefit of commodity markets 
without subjecting themselves to  the discomfort of labor markets. 
In rich countries the unemployed are well supported by the working community, 
that  pays its taxes because i t  is a t  least half aware that  its own restrictive practices are 
the cause of the others being unemployed. No one is hungry; in West Germany the unem- 
ployed are a substantial fraction of the labor force and receive for long periods State in- 
comes that  are 80 per cent of what they would earn if they were working. The communi- 
ty apparently prefers to  arrange things so that  a part of it is working and supporting the 
other part,  rather than all of it working shorter hours. (The unions place impossible con- 
ditions on any proposal to  share the work; their condition for a 35-hour week is in effect 
an immediate increase of 15 per cent in the hourly wage.) 
It is also argued that  the consumption of the unemployed is needed to  keep up 
demand. If the unemployed all went off to  some other country some of those presently em- 
ployed would lose their jobs. This argument is incorrect. The taxes levied for the s u p  
port of the unemployed could simply be paid to  those working, who would increase their 
consumption accordingly. The unemployed have indeed a function as consumers as things 
now stand, but this function would willingly be taken over by those who are working. In 
fact everything would be much simpler; the taxes to support the unemployed would sim- 
ply not be collected but spent by the taxpayers themselves. 
If nothing can tear down that  wall protecting the jobs of the people who are in the 
labor force, then is the excluded population not in excess of the needs of the walled-in 
city? And would the people in the city not be better off if they did not have those people 
on their conscience and on their welfare rolls? And is this not a case for birth control? I 
submit that  the sight of the unemployed, of what looks like superfluous population, is one 
of many factors that  act back on the willingness of parents to have children. 
In the LDCs 
It is in poor countries that  the employment problem becomes grave. Powerful politi- 
cal forces make laws that  give the employed a permanent hold on their jobs. Once a 
young man or woman is appointed assistant in an Indonesian university (that can happen 
before the B.A.) and holds on for one year, he or she has the job for life. There is no force 
or accident that  can remove him-no amount of incompetence or failure t o  perform makes 
an acceptable case for dismissal. One dean I know tried t o  install a rule that  the teacher 
had t o  show up on the campus a t  least once a month or he would lose his tenure; the at- 
tempt failed. 
Everywhere the concern for those who have jobs takes precedence over using the 
abilities of those who are out. The unwillingness to allow an untrammeled labor market 
in the formal sector does not lead to the comfortable leisure that  is unemployment in Eu- 
rope, but to  an informal sector in which a high percentage of the labor force maintains 
itself-that is a truly competitive underclass. Above it is a formal sector that  is even 
more distant from the competitive labor market ideal than is West Germany. That the 
countries that  are prospering-the NICs--set the example of free markets does not 
influence their poorer neighbors. Deregulation has not so far had any impact on employ- 
ment. 
The result is a pervasive hopelessness of youth in LDCs everywhere from Egypt to  
Mexico to  Indonesia. Not a day passes but one sees in the press the political pressures 
that  this builds up. Speaking of North Africa, The Economist (Nov. 26-Dec. 2) says, "Ru- 
naway growth of population, and of cities, has placed time-bombs all along the southern 
coast of the Mediterranean. The streets are filling with unemployed, frustrated young- 
sters. To keep them quiet, governments cling to subsidies and price-controls, which make 
things worse and prevent jobcreating growth." One has to  believe the unanimous judg- 
ments along the same lines of observers from 30 or 40 countries. What is reported is a 
dangerous interaction between the new generation, produced by the high fertility and low 
mortality of the last 20 years, on the one side, and the rigidity of the labor market on the 
other, with its consequences for economic policy and ultimately for political stability. 
Young people attend university in the hope of qualifying themselves for entry into 
the protected job market, and when they finish they cannot be placed. They go back to  
school with the thought that  a further diploma will enable them to  scale the height, and 
moreover the time they lose by further schooling is not worth much anyhow. The situa- 
tion is sadly reminiscent of North America in the 1930s. 
In this situation social order becomes a national preoccupation. It is this as much as 
anything that  makes authoritarian rule an unavoidable stage of development. Those 
countries where there is not firm rule are upset by riots and threatened riots. 
When the existing job holders are protected the private sector is reluctant to  take on 
more people than it absolutely needs, so recruitment in the entry occupations falls off, and 
this affects mostly the young. In countries where there was a huge increase in births sur- 
viving past infancy starting in the 1950s and 1960s, i.e. in practically all of the LDCs, the 
number of youth that  this effects is numerically overwhelming. Add to  that  the rapid ex- 
pansion of education in the 19709, so that  the young people left out are better qualified 
than their elders who have jobs, and one starts to  have an idea of the potentially unset- 
tling consequences of recent population growth. 
Try to tell the administrator of an LDC that has extended its credit to the limit 
that physical capital is not important for employment, that human capital is alone what 
counts! He sees the shortage of real capital as an absolute barrier to employment, to in- 
come, and ultimately to social stability. In today's issue (December 16, 1988) of the 
Jakarta Post, the lead article on the front page is the report of a speech by Radius 
Prawiro, the Minister for Economic Affairs. He puts the matter simply: "At home," he 
says, "our biggest problem is to create jobs for the steadily increasing labor force." And 
then, "Jobs can be created only by increasing investments." 
The LDCs Want Birth Control; Are They Ignorant 
of Their Own Needs? 
Some have said that the LDC authorities are pursuing birth control only because 
westerners have urged them to do so. That gives far too much credit to the westerners-I 
personally can provide assurance that we do not have that degree of influence. The drive 
for birth control comes from within the LDCs, and the employment problem is mentioned 
far more than any other as the reason. Next to that comes natural resources. The argu- 
ments cited in Section 1 showing that resources set no limit to population apply at  most 
to the world as a whole. Poor countries that lack capital by no means see their salvation 
in a chain of inventions that will overcome their limits of land and minerals. 
I have discussed three aspects of the need for a limit on population. Resource substi- 
tution depends on technological capacity that is much harder for poor countries than for 
rich ones. Capital is available in rich countries; it is desperately short in poor ones. 
Unemployment, in the sense that they have no access to  the jobs for which they have been 
trained, is increasingly a problem in the LDCs and makes further additions to the popula- 
tion dangerous for civil order. 
If these three problems were overcome, could a larger population than now exists 
flourish in the LDCs? No. We come to a fourth problem that no likely technical advance 
and no amount of capital that is in sight can dispose of-a universal national problem 
that is also a global problem. 
HUMANS HAVE BECOME A LARGE-SCALE GEOLOGIC FORCE 
The title of this final section is due to V.I. Vernadsky, the Russian geographer writ- 
ing in the 19209, as quoted in SSRC (1988). Thus "human activities are now inducing 
change on a scale comparable to the natural cycles of the earth." The SSRC speaks of "the 
erosion of soils, the pollution of the air of cities, the hazards of earthquakes in built-up 
areas, the genetic dangers of biochemical control of weeds and pests, and the longterm 
menace of rising global mean temperatures" and complains that these concerns have not 
sufficed to bring social scientists into the needed research endeavors. 
The Economy Exists Within a Larger Setting 
Certain future events now coming into view are not provided for in any economic or 
social science model. The economy is set within the ecology, surrounded as it were by the 
ecology, influences the ecology and is limited by the ecology. Perhaps because they were 
closer to nature than contemporary social scientists, the early economists never forgot the 
habitat within which the economy sits. Alfred Marshall considered biology the natural 
science to which economics ought to be closest, but since his time that is not often heard. 
Nonacademic observers of today come closer to this theme than do social scientists. 
Thus a recent issue of The New Yorker (August 28, 1988), a t  the beginning of its "Talk 
of the Town," speaks of "the decimation by air pollution and acid rain of the forests along 
the crest of the Appalachians; the presence of so much floating sewage (some of it medi- 
cal) on the edge of the Eastern Seaboard that  long stretches of public beaches have had to  
be closed; a drought so far-ranging and sustained as to qualify 40 per cent of the counties 
in the United States as disaster areas; and, worldwide, the hottest temperatures in the 
hundred and thirty years that  anyone has been counting." (Four of the hottest years of 
the century have come in the nineteen eighties.) Extensive and more professional 
accounts of such limits of the capacity to sustain population can be found in Barney 
(1980), Ehrlich (1970), Meadows (1972), and Clark (1988). 
Warming of the Biosphere 
At any given level of living, and with given technology, the amount of automobile 
emissions, the amount of water used, the amount of oil consumed, will be proportional t o  
the population. As Kingsley Davis has reminded us, it is people that  produce and con- 
sume these things. 
And it appears that  the planet can stand only so much of these products of the econ- 
omy. James Hansen, head of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, testifying to  a 
Senate committee on the hottest summer in the hundred and thirty years of the record, 
said that  "it is time t o  stop waffling ... and say that  the evidence is pretty strong that  the 
greenhouse effect is here." 
Other writers have expanded on the effects of the warming, some positive, some 
negative. The strongest negative effects will be on rain-fed agriculture in the LDCs 
(Gleick, 1988). Many existing agricultural lands in the US and the USSR will become 
desert, while the more northerly parts of these two countries, and of Canada, will benefit. 
The Arctic could become open sea for a t  least part of each year. The oceans would rise, 
both because their waters would expand on warming, and because of the melting of the 
polar ice caps. Flat coastal lands would become very vulnerable to  storms, in the way 
that  Bangladesh already is. Many of the international river basins would suffer reduced 
flow, and this would contribute to disputes among the riparian states on the division of 
the smaller amount of water. 
On an optimistic assessment there could be no net effect-the good results of warm- 
ing would be just equal t o  the bad. Even in this unlikely case the world still faces an 
enormous problem. For the distribution of population over the face of the earth has 
evolved in some sort of rough relation to  the productivity of soil and climate in the vari- 
ous parts. Over most of human time those parts of the planet whose soil was more fertile 
tended t o  have more people. We need not exaggerate the correspondence, for many other 
factors entered, and there are many cases, as Ester Boserup tells us, when it was not the 
fertility of the soil that  created the people, but the exceptional effort of people that  made 
the soil fertile. Still, starting from the present baseline, one can imagine the dislocation if 
the grain output of the USSR were to  double a t  the same time as that  of India and Africa 
were to  drop by 50 per cent. 
Sustainable Development and Ecological Borrowing 
That the economy is set within the ecology is recognized in the concept of sustain- 
able development, vague and undefined perhaps, but now so respectable that  the United 
Nations has a book on it, with others coming. In the titles of these books appear such 
phrases as "Waste Water Management", "Airborne Sulfur Pollution", "Potentially Toxic 
Chemicals". 
These and other hazards are charges against the economy, though not calculated as 
such. T o  exorcise them will require effort and expense, and much of that  future expense 
will pay for income that  we have already enjoyed. In short some of our past income was 
borrowed; we were not and are not as rich as we thought. Whether it is damage to  the 
ozone layer that  we must seek to  repair (though no one knows quite how) or poisoned 
streams, or dying forests, there will be some sacrifice in the f u t u r ~ i t h e r  we will have to 
pay to clean or repair them, or else the damage to them will make production more costly 
in the future (as in the loss of forests), or else there will be sacrifice of amenities. 
In the words of the Brundtland Commission (WCED 1987) "sustainable develop 
ment is that  development that  meets present needs without compromising the ability of 
future generations to  meet their needs". We are not any the less borrowing because we 
are ignorant of the amount of the loan. For some kinds of borrowing estimates can be 
made. Malcolm Slesser and Jane King (1988) have done something in respect of energy. 
Perhaps an estimate can be made of the cost of cleaning up rivers, because that  has 
actually been done in various parts of Europe. But the cost of forest dieback is going to  
depend on success in finding substitutes for wood. Nothing can replace the forests in their 
function of absorbing carbon dioxide. Nor is there any way to  reconstruct the varieties of 
cultivated plants that  have been abandoned, nor the wild plant and animal species that  
human activities have rendered extinct. It would be an anticlimax to  discuss the general 
untidiness that  goes with progress. Americans have a high tolerance of beer cans, bottles, 
and old newspapers on the streets, and abandoned refrigerators and automobiles in the 
woods. Europeans do not like these things, though with further advance of their 
economies they may get used to them. 
The point is relevant to  the present argument in that  it is people who produce car- 
bon dioxide and destroy the forests of the Amazon to gain (not very long-lasting) farm- 
land. At the present time the number of those who drive motor cars and otherwise live a 
middle class existence is about one billion of the 5 billion on the planet, and it is this bil- 
lion who threaten the biosphere. We may construct a scenario that will help visualize the 
"geological forces" impacting on the planet with the 8 billion people expected by 2025, if 
all of them are middle class. 
CONCLUSION 
After more than a century and a half in which generation after generation of 
economists proved that  a large population was deleterious to  development, the discipline 
went into reverse in the 1970s and argued that population does not make much difference. 
Whatever the overt argument for this, its real justification is that  the march of science 
and resulting economic innovation permit a substitution of common resources for scarce 
ones, so that  resource limits to population have largely disappeared. 
This reversal of economic theory exactly corresponds to  the reversal of the popula- 
tion problem for the developed countries-the one fifth of the world world that  is facing 
population decline. The French, the English, the German and the American publics 
readily a g r e e t h e y  have been saying it themselves since the 1960s-that the issue raised 
by Malthus is decreasingly applicable to them. Neoclassical economics has indeed indi- 
cated the solution to  the problem of too many people--applicable to the countries where 
the problem no longer exists. (I optimistically disregard polluted streams, forest dieback, 
and a corrosive atmosphere in many places, supposing that  the wealth of Europe and 
America can clean these up a t  the present levels of population.) 
The less developed countries contain four fifths of the world population, are responsi- 
ble for 9/10 of present population growth, and can expect 100 per cent of the world's po- 
pulation growth as the century comes to a close. They do not have the spare land, or the 
capital, t o  accommodate their burgeoning citizenry. The demand for their raw materials 
constituted the economic basis on which they started their upward course, and now the 
science of the developed countries has invented substitutes that  undercut that  economic 
basis. 
One could say that  the LDCs are in the position that  the MDCs were in when 
Malthus, Ricardo, Mill and the other great economists lived, except that  the position of 
many is much worse. Not only do they face resource limits as our ancestors did, but their 
populations are orders of magnitude greater, and they have installed systems of mass edu- 
cation that  give their young people expectations incompatible with available resources 
and capital. Their students do not obtain from college the skills of the best western en- 
gineers and scientists, but one thing they do get from college: the highest of expectations. 
The LDCs could not fully employ their young people when their net borrowing was a t  its 
peak; what about now when they are paying back? 
The last thing they want or need is the prospective further growth in their unem- 
ployed youth. They see a birth today as a young man or woman with a high school or 
college diploma in 2010, unable t o  get the job for which he or she was supposedly trained. 
Our science, that  has produced the substitutes (for rubber, sisal, cane sugar) from 
which their economies are suffering, affects them very differently from the way i t  affects 
us. They do not have the high level scientific manpower t o  understand, import and apply 
it,  let alone t o  discover new science that  will be appropriate t o  their particular problems. 
And even if their educational systems produced young people with the knowledge and 
skill that  was consonant with their expectations, as their debt service increases they have 
less of the capital that  would enable them to put that  knowledge and skill t o  work. 
That  is why they see the neoclassical view that  the population problem is essentially 
solved as a monumental ethnocentrism. 
So much for the first three points of my argument. Let me offer a scenario that  will 
clarify the fourth point. It is improbable but not inconceivable, the endpoint within the 
first quarter of the 21st century of a trend that  is already visible in 1989. 
A FINAL SCENARIO FOR PLANET EARTH 
Suppose that  by 2025 the economic problem is everywhere solved (Keynes' (1932) 
expression) in the sense that  GNP per capita is growing at  more than 3 per cent per year 
and either there is full employment or the unemployed are comfortably supported on so- 
cial security. All of the standard indexes indicate unprecedented prosperity. 
Meanwhile the atmosphere is warming and rainfall patterns are changing, deserts are 
continuing to spread a t  the same rate as in the 1980s and have come t o  cover the larger 
part of the planet, water tables everywhere are falling, holes in the ozone layer are rapidly 
increasing cancer deaths, locust and other pest outbreaks are more and more frequent, all 
the tropical forests have disappeared and the last of the boreal forests are threatened. 
Among other irreversible changes half of the plant and animal species existing 50 years 
earlier have become extinct. 
As has always been the convention, GNP can continue to  rise because it is calculated 
gross of all depreciation; for national income the depreciation of plant and equipment is 
netted out, but not the deterioration of nature. The greater part of the very high nation- 
al incomes has to  be spent on disposing of wastes, on replanting of trees, on transporting 
water, on making dikes against the incursions of the oceans, on fighting pests, on restoring 
soils. These are all entered on the plus side of the national income, but the deterioration 
that  they are (partially) correcting is nowhere subtracted. National accounts measure the 
sustainability of our activities insofar as they depend on plant and equipment, but make 
no pretense of measuring sustainability insofar as they depend on nature. With other 
things fixed, every one of the unmeasured negative elements mentioned above is related to 
population. 
In this scenario people would feel poorer and poorer, despite the assurance offered by 
the steadily rising income per capita. 
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